I believe that the next generation of AI turing machines will be conscious turing machines that no longer read just tape but have their own consciousness that allows them to fix code or even be aware of its own code and fix it if it gets a virus.
Shared from Wolfram Cloud.
The smallest machine of its kind in the world uses a single photon as its qubit and it can perform calculations without needing the cumbersome equipment to cool it down to near absolute zero.
Scientists have revived activity in the brains of pigs up to nearly an hour after circulation had ceased.
In some cases, functionality was sustained for hours through a surprising discovery by researchers in China.
This book is about the explanatory relevance of representational content in constitutive mechanistic explanations typical in cognitive neuroscience.
This book describes the philosophical implications of artificial general intelligence, cognitive enhancements and the smart environment on the human mind.
This monograph examines the metaphysical commitments of the new mechanistic philosophy, a way of thinking that has returned to center stage. It challenges a variant of reductionism with regard to higher-level phenomena, which has crystallized as a default position among these so-called New Mechanists. Furthermore, it opposes those philosophers who reject the possibility of interlevel causation.
Contemporary philosophers believe that the explanation of scientific phenomena requires the discovery of relevant mechanisms. As a result, new mechanists are, in the main, concerned solely with epistemological questions. But, the author argues, their most central claims rely on metaphysical assumptions. Thus, they must also take into account metaphysics, a system of thought concerned with explaining the fundamental nature of being and the world around it. This branch of philosophy does indeed matter to the empirical sciences.
The chapters investigate the nature of mechanisms, their components, and the ways in which they can bring about different phenomena. In addition, the author develops a novel account of causation in terms of activities.
From the reviews:
“If you thought reductionism about the mind was dead, think again: you may find John Bickle’s vigorously and powerfully argued Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account a real eye-opener. His guiding idea is that the proof of reductionism is in the track record of reductionist research strategies in neuroscience, in explaining mentality and behavior — and even qualitative consciousness itself. And Bickle does not disappoint: he serves up a veritable feast of reductionist success stories, from deep down in cellular and molecular neuroscience. Some of the details he describes will amaze, and perhaps also delight, you. Bickle’s discussion is invigorating as well as philosophically sophisticated, and his knowledge of current research in neuroscience is impressive indeed. The writing is clear, brisk, and refreshingly straightforward, and the book brims with enthusiasm and optimism. This is the latest salvo from the reductionist side, and a mighty one it is! It may not win the battle outright for reductionism, but it is going to change the shape and terms of the debate to come. A must read for those interested in the issues of psychoneural reduction and reductionism, and highly recommended to anyone with a broad interest in the philosophy of mind and psychology.” (Jaegwon Kim, Brown University)
“Bickle now practices metascience … a large part of the book consists of neuroscientific case studies. … Bickle’s experimental cases are fascinating and his book qualifies as a showcase of naturalism in the philosophy of mind. As such it deserves to be read by any philosopher with naturalistic leanings. … Bickle has provided food for thought. … It manifests a profound respect for empirical developments, and a healthy criticism of philosophical hobbyhorses and entrenched reasoning patterns. This makes the book worthwhile reading.” (Huib Looren de Jong and Maurice K. D. Schouten, PhilosophicalPsychology, Vol. 18 , 2005)
This book dissolves the most vicious problem of scientific realism (i.e., the problem of scientific representation). It Combines the philosophical and scientific resources of Structural Realism along with Ronald Giere and friend’s Cognitive Models of Science approach.
How much carbon dioxide (CO2) do plants absorb from the atmosphere? This is what a recent study published in Nature hopes to address as a team of researchers investigated what’s known as the Terrestrial Gross Primary Product (GPP), which measures the amount of CO2 that photosynthesis removes from the atmosphere. This study holds the potential to help researchers, climate scientists, legislators, and the public better understand the role that plants play in reducing carbon emissions, along with mitigating the effects of climate change worldwide.
“Figuring out how much CO2 plants fix each year is a conundrum that scientists have been working on for a while,” said Dr. Lianhong Gu, who is a distinguished research scientist at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and a co-author on the study. “The original estimate of 120 petagrams per year was established in the 1980s, and it stuck as we tried to figure out a new approach. It’s important that we get a good handle on global GPP since that initial land carbon uptake affects the rest of our representations of Earth’s carbon cycle.”
Petagrams are the standard measurement used for GPP, with one petagram equaling 1 billion metric tons, and the latter being the amount of CO2 discharged from the total number of gas-powered passenger vehicles in the world, which is approximately 1.4 billion.
